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This paper provides a sensitivity analysis of the relative performance of inflation targeting, price level targeting, and hybrid 
targeting, the combination of these two. A simple, three-period, steady state to steady state economy is presented, where 
monetary policy is facing various sets of forward and backward looking expectations, social preferences on inflation and 
output gap stabilization, and degrees of cost push shock persistence. we derive optimal policy mix under the whole 
spectrum of these economic conditions, reporting also the criteria of the replicability of the theoretically optimal solution. 
The  main  intention  of  the  examination  is  to  reveal  the  nature  of  each  interrelation  between  economic  and  policy 
parameters. The results show that (i) the relative strength of regimes depends heavily on the preconditions, and that (ii) the 
relationships of parameters related to the performance are non-linear and occasionally non-monotonic as well. our model 
specification is somewhat restrictive, however, contrary to the related literature, the examination, even in the intermediate 
cases, can be conducted analytically.
JEL: E50, E52, E58.
Keywords: hybrid inflation-price level targeting, hybrid new keynesian Phillips curve, cost push shock persistence.
Ebben az írásban az inflációs célkövetés, az árszínvonal célkitűzés, valamint ezek kombinációjának, a hibrid célkitűzésnek az 
érzékenységvizsgálatát  követhetjük  nyomon.  Egy  egyszerű,  háromperiódusos,  egyensúlyi  helyzettől  egyensúlyi  helyzetig 
mozgó gazdaságot mutatunk be, melyben a monetáris politika az előre és hátratekintő várakozásoknak, az infláció és az output 
gap stabilizációjára vonatkozó társadalmi preferenciának, valamint a cost push sokk perzisztenciának különböző összetételei-
vel szembesül. Levezetjük az optimális politikai mixet ezen gazdasági paraméterek valamennyi lehetséges kombinációja mel-
lett, jelezve az elvi szinten optimális politika reprodukálhatóságának kritériumait. A vizsgálat legfőképp arra irányul, hogy 
feltárjon minden egyes összefüggést a gazdasági és policy paraméterek között. Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy (i) a rezsimek 
relatív ereje nagyban függ az előfeltételektől, valamint hogy (ii) az egyes paraméterek viszonya a teljesítmény vonatkozásában 
nem lineáris, és bizonyos esetekben nem is monoton. Modellspecifikációnk némileg korlátozó, mindazonáltal így a vizsgála-
tokat – a vonatkozó irodalomtól eltérően – köztes esetekben is analitikusan tudjuk végezni.
Abstract
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The difference between the policy of inflation targeting and price level targeting can be captured in their attitude to shocks 
affecting price level. In most general terms, inflation targeting attempts to maintain a targeted inflation path, and does not 
care for unanticipated misses in the past which implies the rising uncertainty around the future price level. Price level targeting 
attempts to maintain a targeted price path which implies that uncertainty around the price level does not increase with the 
progress of time.1 In others words, thinking in terms of price level, inflation targeting is a regime without memory, while price 
level targeting is a history-dependent policy.
A fixed price level has reasonable benefits. Planning and contracting becomes easier as nominal values become real values. 
The information learnt from prices is without any distortion, since their realignments would purely reflect scarcity, which 
enhances the resource allocation mechanism. The continuous transfer of welfare from the cash holders to the government 
using inflation device (not just surprise inflation!) is also wiped out. However, the idea of price level targeting has been 
criticized from both practical and theoretical standpoint.2 The “conventional wisdom”, as svensson (1999) named it, states 
that the consequence of price level stabilization is the higher volatility of inflation and output gap.3 “The intuition is 
straightforward: In order to stabilize the price level under price-level targeting, higher-than-average inflation must be 
succeeded by lower-than-average inflation. This should result in higher inflation variability than inflation targeting, since 
in the latter case, base level drift is accepted and higher-than-average inflation need only be succeeded by average inflation. 
Via nominal rigidities, the higher inflation variability should then result in higher output variability.” svensson (1999, p. 
278) svensson (1999) pointed out that the root of the conventional results arises from the usage of postulated reaction 
functions instead of endogenous decision rules. He showed, using a new Classical Phillips curve, that under discretion 
price level targeting provides lower inflation variability, than inflation targeting does, without affecting the output gap 
variability at the same time, if there is sufficiently high persistence in the output gap. He called this “free lunch”. All other 
things being equal, Dittmar and gavin (2000) used ‘new keynesian expectations’. Their analysis showed that price level 
targeting always outperforms inflation targeting both in inflation and output gap variability. They also demonstrated that 
the rise of the output gap persistence further amplifies this advantage. Vestin (2006) made his comparison in a ‘new 
keynesian economy’ with cost push shock persistence. He also demonstrated that free lunch result holds, even if there is 
no endogenous output gap persistence, and that if there is no persistence in cost push shocks, price level targeting can 
implement  commitment  solution.  with  exogenous  inflation  persistence,  price  level  targeting  can  be  also  better  than 
inflation targeting, though the key issue is the assignment of proper preference weight in the loss function of the central 
bank.4
As woodford (2000) emphasized, the optimal policy under commitment is history-dependent in the case of forward looking 
expectations. However, since it is generally time-inconsistent, it does not provide a too realistic solution.5 The point is to 
implement such a discretionary policy, that can incorporate the past in the decision making process. A predetermined price 
1 Withaconstantinflationtarget,inflationisstationary,whilethe(log)pricelevelhasaunitroot.Iftheinflationtargetiszero,the(log)pricelevelfollowsrandomwalk,
ifitisapositivevalue,thenthe(log)pricelevelfollowsastochastictrend.Withaconstantpriceleveltarget,thepricelevelisstationaryaroundthetargetedvalue,
andinflationisstationary,too,aroundzero.Ifthetargeted(log)pricepathhasaconstantpositiveslope,thenthe(log)pricelevelistrendstationaryasitfollowsa
deterministictrend,andinflationbecomesstationaryaroundtheslopeofthe(log)targetedpricepath.
2 Fischer(1994)arguesthatsinceindexedfinancialassetsandnominalcontractingaregiven,targetedpricelevelhasnottoomuchsense.McCallum(1999)alsoclaims
thattheabovementionedbenefitswouldnotbesignificantintheUnitedStates.
3 Svensson(1999)referedtothewritingsofLebow,RobertsandStockton(1992),Fischer(1994),andHaldaneandSalmon(1995).
4 Svensson(1999)andDittmarandGavin(2000)derivedtheirresultsdelegatingthesamepreferenceweightintothelossfunctionsofthecentralbanks.Itisimportant
toemphasizethatconsideringnothingbutthevalueofthepreferenceweights,aregimetargetinginflationandaregimetargetingpricelevelcannotbecompared
tofigureouthowmuchtheyare“conservative”.Ininflationtargeting,theweightindicatestherelativesignificanceofthevariabilityofoutputgapcomparedtothe
variabilityofinflation,whileinpriceleveltargeting,itsignsthesametothevariabilityofpricelevel.
5 Woodford’s(1999)conceptof“timelessperspective”ignorestheinitialconditionsoftheregime,eventuateincommitmentpolicythatistime-consistent.
1	IntroductionMnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 7
InTroDuCTIon
level target operates as a solid nominal anchor, and incorporates history dependent policy.6 under new Classical Phillips 
curve, current inflation-output gap trade off is not affected by inflation expectations, as they are predetermined. However, as 
Barnett and Engineer (2001) explained, with the existence of sufficiently high persistence in the output gap, rational agents 
indirectly form their expectations in a forward looking manner, as they know the future persistency effects of the current 
output gap affecting the trade off. In a new keynesian economy the relation is more straightforward, as here inflation 
expectations affect inflation-output gap trade-off right in the present, and so the gains of a credible price level target arise 
immediately.7
since efficiency of price level targeting and inflation targeting is sensitive to the key assumptions on, for instance, expectations, 
several examinations were concluded with creating more generalized economic environments and implementing new hybrid 
policies. nessén and Vestin (2005) demonstrated, using a new keynesian Phillips curve, that a policy targeting the average 
inflation of several forthcoming periods provides better performance than inflation targeting, but worse than price level 
targeting.8 They also showed, using a hybrid Phillips curve with exogenous inflation persistence, that if backward pricing 
more and more characterizes the economy, then the benefits of price level targeting deteriorates, and from one point average 
inflation targeting will offer the best solution, while approaching rather backward looking economy, inflation targeting 
becomes  the  best  out  of  the  discretionary  regimes.  under  similar  conditions,  walsh  (2003)  also  came  to  these  results 
examining an alternative policy aimed at stabilizing the change in the output gap (so called “speed limit” policy). Batini and 
Yates (2003) analyzed such a hybrid regime that combines the characteristics of inflation targeting and price level targeting, 
incorporating the weighted average of inflation and price level target into the central bank’s loss function. Analyzing different 
policy rules (optimal, contemporaneous, and forward looking rules) under two sets of inflation expectation structure (a 
partially and a fully forward looking set), they came to totally different results in point of inflation, output gap, and price 
level variability. At a certain expectation mix that contains forward and backward looking elements, they concluded that 
hybrid targeting is better than unmixed policies when policy rules are set in a forward looking manner, instead of using simple 
rules with smaller information set such as Taylor’s (1993). on the contrary, in the fully forward looking case, pure policies 
always dominate hybrid policies. Analyzing open economy aspects, they found antagonistic forces. The familiar effect is that 
price level targeting helps to lower inflation variability through the expectational channel, on the other hand, the higher 
variability of interest rate under price level targeting increases the variability of exchange rate, thus increases variability of 
inflation more than under inflation targeting, eventuating in an unknown resultant. In point of output gap persistence, the 
results of Batini and Yates (2003) contradict those of svensson’s (1999), since in their model the rise of persistency leads to 
the deterioration of inflation stabilizing performance of price level targeting.9 Cecchetti and kim (2005) showed that in an 
economy represented by a new Classical Phillips curve with sufficiently high output gap persistence, an appropriately chosen 
hybrid target according to the degree of persistence results in optimal policy.10 Contrary to the results of Batini and Yates 
(2003), they did not find significantly different outcomes when moving from a closed to an open economy model.
6 Commitmentmeansthatthecentralbankstickstotheplan,whatevereventsmaycome.Onthecontrary,inthecaseofdiscretionarydecision-making,anoptimization
processtakesplaceineveryperiodbasedonthenewcircumstances–anewplanissettled.KydlandandPrescott(1977),andBarroandGordon(1983)haverevealed
thatinthelattercase,thecentralbankquiteoftenhasthetemptationtoraiseoutputoverthepotentiallevelbyusingsurpriseinflation.However,actorsofthe
economycannotbecheatedonalongrun,whichresultsinthefalloftheoutputtotheoriginallevelwithhigherinflation.Thedifferencebetweentheexperienced
averageinflationrateandtheinflationtargetistheso-calledinflation bias. Evenifthecentralbankhadnosuchintention,itwouldsufferfromcredibilitydeficitdue
tothelackofalong-termcommitment,whichresultsinhigherlossduetothemoredrasticinterventionsneeded.Thisistheso-calledstabilization bias. Allthese
phenomenaoriginateintheproblemoftime-inconsistency,i.e.adecisionwhichlookedgoodbeforefailstobeoptimalaftertheexpectationsformed.Commitment
solutionexcludescheatingpossibility,thusresultsintheachievablesocialoptimum(Inotherwords,expectedlossisthelowestundercommitment;inflationbias
andstabilizationbiasunderdiscretioncanbeinterpretedrelativelytothisbenchmark.)However,theproblemisthatthissolutionisnotrealistic,becauseitistime-
inconsistent.Theadvantageofthediscretionarydecision-makingisthatitgivesspacetoreacttonon-foreseeableeconomicchanges.Thegoalistosetsuch
“guaranties”thatdonothindertheoperationflexibilityofthecentralbank,butwhereitcanalsoincreaseitscredibility,henceitisabletoreducetheaforementioned
biases.Inflationtargetingandpriceleveltargetingunderdiscretionbearprecommitmentfeaturesinadifferentextent,whichisakeyfactorintheirrelative
performance.
7 InSvensson’sNewClassicalmodel,inflationisthelinearfunctionoftheoutputgapunderinflationtargeting,whileunderpriceleveltargeting,itis(withequal
functionalform)thelinearfunctionofthechangeintheoutputgap.SinceoutputmovementisdefinedasanAR(1)process,thevarianceofthegapislower,thanthe
varianceofthefirstdifferenceofthegap,iftheautoregressivecoefficientislargerthan0.5.IntheNewKeynesiancase,theresultcomesfromthemicrofoundation
thatthepricesettingopportunitiesofthefirmsarestochasticallyandexogenouslygiven.Thiskindofstaggeredpricesettingensuresthatrationalagents‘damp’their
pricesettingsensitivityonmarginalcostchangesinthecaseofacrediblepriceleveltarget.
8 Notethatpriceleveltargetingisapolicythattargetsaverageinflationofinfiniteperiods,whileinflationtargetingaimsthe‘average’ofoneperiodaheadonly.
Propertiesoftheintermediatecase(i.e.averageinflationtargeting)areextensivelyexaminedusingbackwardlookingPhillipscurvebyNessén(2002).
9 BatiniandYates(2003)argueditisthereasonthatintheirmodeloutputgapdependsonothervariables,whileinthemodelofSvensson(1999)itfollowsanAR(1)
process,thusintheirmodelamorepersistentoutputgapishardertocontrol.
10 InthemodelofCecchettiandKim(2005)theoutputgapfollowsanAR(1)process,justlikeinSvensson’s(1999).Undersameconditions,Kobayashi(2005)presented
thathybridtargetingalwaysgivesbettersolutionthanpriceleveltargeting,butitoutperformsinflationtargetingonlywhentheautoregressivecoefficientislarger
than1/3.RecallthatSvensson(1999)showedthatpriceleveltargetingdominatesinflationtargetingwhenthecoefficientislargerthan0.5.MAgYAr nEMZETI BAnk
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In  this  paper,  the  examination  extended  to  all  intermediate  cases  of  expectation  spectrum,  fully  highlighting  the 
interrelationships between the hybrid policy weight-expectation weight-social preference weight-Phillips curve slope-cost 
push shock persistence dimensions and their related social loss implications. Furthermore, utilizing a three-period analytical 
framework, we are able to do this analytically. we provide the optimal hybrid policy weight and also the existence criteria of 
the replicability of the model’s theoretical benchmark, and examine the underlying factors of inflation and output gap 
variability as well.
Batini and Yates (2003) applied only a fixed hybrid expectation structure, thus they did not analyse all of the intermediate 
cases and did not derive optimal hybrid policy weight analytically. Cecchetti and kim (2005) derived optimal hybrid policy 
analytically, but under new Classical Phillips curve with output gap persistence, thus did not examine the impact of various 
expectation structures.11 By construction, none of them analyzed the implications of the interdependence of endogenous and 
exogenous persistence related to the relative performance issues of the regimes, which we will.
our results show that nonlinearities like the one experienced in performance when moving on the spectrum of regimes 
described by Batini and Yates (2003) and Cecchetti and kim (2005) are also perceivable when examining the spectrum of 
expectations, as well as other variables. Thus, it is important to unfold as much of these connectivities as possible.
Briefly, the paper proceeds as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. section 3 and 4 provides comparative analysis 
under different economic circumstances, beginning with the least realistic case up to the most general case. section 5 gives a 
brief empirical outlook related to the results, while section 6 concludes.
11 Recallingtheanalogousexaminations,inthecaseofaverageinflationtargeting,NessénandVestin(2005)alsodidnotofferanalyticalsolutionswhentheconsidered
horizonofcalculatingtheaverageinflationrateislongerthantwoperiods,because,astheynoted,thosecasesareanalyticallyintractable.Walsh(2003)alsoused
numericalmethodsinhiscomparativeanalysis.MnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 9
2.1		The	eCoNomy
suppose that current inflation in the economy is given by factors presented in the following system of hybrid Phillips curve 
and aggregate demand,12
1| 1 (1 ) t t t t t t x u π φπ φ π δ + − = + − + + ,  (1)
1 ( ) t t x f instruments − = ,
where (in a logarithm) pt is the inflation rate, pt+1 t is the forward looking rational inflation expectation, pt–1 is the backward 
looking adaptive inflation expectation, xt is the output gap (the difference between the actual and the natural level of output), 
ut is an Ar(1) disturbance term,  ut=ρut–1+e, where et is an i.i.d. with zero mean and variance of s2, and φ, δ, ρ are constants 
(0≤φ≤1,δ>0); φ gives the composition of the expectations of the agents in economy, δ denotes the ‘slope’ coefficient of the 
Phillips curve (accurately, the relation of the output gap to the difference of inflation realized and the one expected), and ρ 
indicates the persistence of cost push type supply shock.13
what does this Phillips curve consider and what does it not cover? Inflation is influenced by three factors on a general basis: 
expectations, shocks, and cyclic factors. The model captures various expectation structures, persistent cost push shock, and it 
also  considers  a  one-period  monetary  control  lag.  As  shocks  affecting  potential  output  and  aggregate  demand  are  not 
modelled14, the value of xt is unambiguously determined by the monetary instruments (usually specified as policy interest rate) 
set before the period, namely on the basis of the information in period t–1. Although xt is under the perfect control of the 
central bank, actually, it can respond to a concurrent shock in the next periods only. It follows that contrary to the more 
prevalent assumption of the topic literature, the central bank has not perfect control over inflation.15
Both endogenous and exogenous inflation persistence stand in accordance with the general perception that the inflation 
process  has  inertia,  however,  they  presume  widely  different  policy  implications.16  Furthermore,  the  lowered  reaction 
capability of the central bank reflects that monetary actions exert their full impact in a longer time.
2.2		The	RegImes
we consider four regimes, the theoretical benchmark and three discretionary solutions, namely inflation targeting with 
commitment, inflation targeting, price level targeting, and the hybrid regime of the latter two. standard quadratic loss 
functions  used  in  the  literature  generally  incorporate  the  inflation,  output  gap,  and  seldom  the  nominal  interest  rate 
variability.
12Notationqi|jisusedinsteadofEjqi.Bothdenotetheexpectedvalueofthevariableqattimeiconditionaluponinformationavailableintime j.
13 AsGalíandGertler(1999)discusseditsmicrofoundations,thisformofthePhillipscurveisevolvingfromthepricesettingbehaviourofthefirms.Intheirstaggered
price setting model, the competition is monopolistic, thus the‘benchmark’ output level (the natural level of output) implies equilibrium under imperfectly
competitivemarketswithoutnominalrigidities.Coefficientdcomprisesthesensitivityofmarginalcosttochangesinoutputgapandthesensitivityoffirms’price
adjustmentinrelationtomarginalcost.Termutcapturesmovementsinmarginalcostduetofactorsotherthanoutputgap;itdisappearseventuallyifnoother
marketfrictionsexistthannominalpricerigidity.Morecomplicatedquantitativemodelsintroducewagerigidityaswell(usuallyenteringstaggeredwagecontracts
àlaErcegetal.(2000)inordertoendogenizetherunofthecostpushshock.Inourmodel,wetreatutasexogenouslygiven.
14 Nevertheless,itisnotashortcomingatall,ifweconsiderthestudyofColettietal.(2008).UtilizingaformoftheIMF’sfull-scale,multi-country,dynamicstochastic
generalequilibriummodel(GlobalEconomicModel,GEM),theyshowedthatpriceleveltargetingperformsalwaysbetterthaninflationtargetingconsidering
demandshocks,independentlyfromtheexpectationstructure.Theyalsoshowed,however,thatITbeginstodominatePT,whenpriceandwagemark-upshockshit
theeconomy,iftheproportionofrule-of-thumbpriceandwagesettersshiftsfrom40percentto50percent.Relyingonthisresult,wemayfocussolelyonthe
impactsofthelatterkindofshocksthat,intheshortrun,createantagonisticmovementsbetweeninflationandoutputgap,offeringatrade-offbetweeninflation
stabilizationandoutputgapstabilization.
15 Svensson(1999),Vestin(2006),DittmarandGavin(2000),NessénandVestin(2005),CecchettiandKim(2005)allassumedthatthecentralbankhasperfectcontrol
overinflationwiththeconcurrentchangeoftheoutputgap,andsupposedthattheoutputgapistheinstrument.OurapproachisanalogouswiththeoneofBatini
andYates(2003),whousedbackwardlookingISfunction;however,withtheeliminationofcontroluncertainty,wecanutilizethesimplicityofthepreviousmethod.
16Propertiesofendogenousinflationpersistence,aswellasautoregressiveexogenousshocksareextensivelyexaminedinClaridaetal.(1999).
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under  inflation  targeting  with  commitment  (ITC),  the  central  bank  makes  a  precommitment  to  its  future  actions,  and 
optimizes in the initial period only. This theoretical benchmark solution minimizes the intertemporal social loss function 
itself, which is
1 1 * 2 * 2
1 1
1
( ) ( )
2
β β π π λ
∞ ∞
− −
= =
  = − + −   ∑ ∑
t t
t t t t t
t t
E L E x x ,  (2)
where l reflects the relative importance of output gap variability compared to the importance of inflation variability.17 
since central banks to be examined supposedly cannot credibly precommit, their delegated objective functions differ from 
society’s preference representation for better outcomes in terms of social loss.18 In the case of inflation targeting (IT) the 
central bank tries to pursue the targeted value of inflation and output gap, namely to minimize the expected loss
 
0 0
1 1 * 2 * 2 1 ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )
2
β β π π λ
∞ ∞
− −
= =
  = − + −   ∑ ∑
t t
t t t t t
t t t t
E L E x x  (3)
in every period.19 svensson (1999) replaced the inflation target to price level target in this ‘standard’ loss function. In price 
level targeting (PT) regime, the central bank tries to neutralize the divergence from the targeted price level and output gap, 
namely aims to minimize the loss function
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in every period. If inflation, output gap, and price level are incorporated in such a way that the weighted mixture of the 
inflation and price level targets are used in the loss function, we obtain hybrid targeting (HT). In this case, the loss function 
to be minimized in every period is
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where 0<θ<1.20 It is perceivable that if θ=0, we get to IT, and if θ=1, then we get to PT.
2.3		The	ThRee-peRIoD	ANALyTICAL	fRAmewoRk
The framework to be presented is examining a steady state to steady state economy. The economy is hit by a single shock (et) 
at the beginning of the first period. For simplicity, suppose that the significance of the events in each period is equivalent 
(b=1).21 In period 0, the economy is in steady state, i.e. the state variables and expected values of them (pt+1 t, pt, pt–1, and 
xt) are equal to zero, and for simplicity, price level (pt) is normalized also to zero. Again for convenience, inflation target (pt*) 
in the case of ITC and IT, and price level target (pt*) in the case of PT are also set to zero.22 supposing that economy works 
on its long time potential, neither discretionary regimes endeavour to aim an output level differing from the potential one in 
any case creating surprise inflation (xt*=0), namely there is no inflation bias. Thus, the scope of the examination is on 
stabilization bias, originating also from dynamic inconsistency.
17 This specification can be deducted from microeconomic basis, usually utilizing general equilibrium models with infinite lived agents and monopolistically
competitivefirmswithstaggeredpricesetting.Indetail,forinstance,RotembergandWoodford(1998)definedsuchageneralequilibriummodel,whereconsumers
hasCESutilityfunctiontooptimizeunderinfinitetimehorizon,whiletheproductionfunctionwastheonepresentedbyCalvo(1983),wherethepossibilitiesoffirms
tomodifypricesaregivenstochasticallyandexogenously.Outputgaptermcatchesthedisutilityofconsumptionfluctuation,whileinflationtermrepresentsthe
drawbackofpricedispersionaffectingproduction.Note,however,thatthismodelimpliespurelyforwardlookingagents,thustheexactTaylorapproximationof
utilitywillmoreorlessdifferfromlossfunction(2),whenthecoexistenceoffirmswithruleofthumbpricesettingbehaviourisalsopresumed.Nevertheless,since
theliteratureubiquitouslyappliesitinthecaseofsimilarexaminationsofpolicyissues,wewillsticktothisform.
18 TheanalysisofSöderström(2001)andSteinsson(2003)showedthatoptimalpolicyunderdiscretionputssignificantlylowerweightonoutputgapstabilisationthan
society,moreover,undercertainspecifications,thisweightisveryclosetozero.Recall,however,thatrevealingtherealpreferenceofasocietyisimpossible;its
theoreticalestimationsprovidesignificantlydifferentvalues,firmlydependingonmodelspecifications.
19Thoughitisnotmarked,thecentralbanks’targetvaluesofthevariablescandifferaswell.
20 AsBatiniandYates(2003)notedreferringtoLarryBallandFrankSmets,thisweightingmethodincorporatesthecovariancetermbetweeninflationandpricelevel
intothelossfunction.
21 Thoughstarting-upfromanotherbasis,intheirexamination,CecchettiandKim(2005)concludedthatresultsofcomparativewelfareanalysisarenotsensitivetothe
choiceofb.Wewilldemonstratethatthereareanalogiesthatallowustorelyuponthisresult.
22 Notethatsettingtheinitiallogarithmicpricelevelandtargettozerotheoreticallyimpliestheexistenceofnegativelogarithmicprices.Anyhow,pricesremainalways
positive.MnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 11
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In  practice,  none  of  the  monetary  regimes  can  temporize  the  pursuing  of  previously  communicated  targets  without 
deteriorating credibility, but the scale is largely depend on what the economic agents surmise on the reliability of the central 
bank.23 Eventually, excess recalibration of the path of the targeted variable erodes the trust in the declared policy for sure. In 
this sense, the three-period model covers the reasonable time horizon where declared targets should be achieved in order to 
maintain  high  credibility  in  the  absence  of  commitment  technology24,  that  is,  where  the  immanent  characteristics  (i.e. 
fundamental differences) of the regimes are clearly revealed; however, only in ‘low resolution’ (ˆ 0 λ λ λ = = =
  ).25 Thus, 
suppose that discretionary regimes have the credibility in point of reaching their final goals considering rational agents, that 
is the forward looking economic agents fully understand the nature of the regime, and trust in the pursuing of the declared 
target.26 The expectations can be formalized to
 
1| 1| t t t t t p p π + + = − ,  (6)
where pt+1 t means the expected price level of the next period. These expectations manifest in different manner, depending 
on the characteristics of the discretionary regime. In IT, the agents expect that a zero inflation target is pursued, namely that 
the price level of next period will be the same as in the concurrent period (pt+1 t= pt). In PT, it is believed that monetary 
actions are in order to assure the targeted price level, namely zero (pt+1 t= p*=0). what do the agents of the economy expect 
in HT? It depends what emphasis the price level target bears, namely from the grade of ‘history dependency’. In every period, 
they expect that θ proportion of the inflation occurred in the first period will be undone, or in other words, their expected 
price level target will be
 
1| 1 (1 )
t
t t p p θ + = − .  (7)
with this model specification, expectations are driven by policy framework and formed by past actions at the same time. At 
latest in the fourth period, economy is again in steady state. It is in accordance with the model setup, that is, there is no long 
run trade-off between inflation and output gap in the absence of cost push disturbance, i.e. the output gap converges to zero. 
since the examined discretionary regimes supposedly exclude inflationary policies, steady state means zero inflation and fully 
closed output gap. Model calibration has been summarized in Table 1, while the solutions of the model are presented by   
Table 2 (details in Appendix A).
Two restraints of the model should be emphasized. First, in period 3, because of the existence of lagged price term, inflation 
should be zero in order to ensure steady state in period 4 (for further details see Appendix A). second, since the disturbance 
term is an Ar(1) process, and so it calms down within the progress of time, its effects from period 4 are disregarded.
23 In the 1990s, early inflation targeters were criticized because inflation target, which meant disinflation at that time, was in the foreground causing higher
unemploymentrate;howeverthatwasthewayofgainingcredibility.Aftersuccessfuldisinflation,secondarygoals(e.g.output,interestrate,exchangerate)started
tomoveintotheforeground.Withbuilt-upcredibility,thecounter-actionstomitigateapotentialshockassoonaspossiblewereandareusedlessfrequently,and
gradualapproachisemphasized.
24 CecchettiandKim(2005)gaveanapproximationovertheoptimalevaluationhorizonforthecentralbanks,namelythehorizon,wheredesiredpricepathshouldbe
achieved,whichtheydefinein(1–θ)–1(plustransmissionlag).Aswewillsee,itisinaccordancewithour‘reasonable’timehorizonapproach,sinceinourmodel,first
IT,laterHT,andatlatest,PTprovidetheproperadjustmenttothedesiredpricepath.
25 Noteagainthatputtingweightsolelyoninflation/priceleveltargetsinthelossfunctionsofthecentralbanksisthereasonofthelowresolution(three-period)model
structure,ratherthantheconsiderationof“strict”targeting.Instead,inouranalysiscentralbankscanbeconsideredas“conservatives”inthesensethattheir
preferenceweightonoutputgapisequalorlowerthanthatofsociety.
26 AsCecchettiandKim(2005)noted,hybridpolicyhasthedisadvantagethatitisveryhardtobecommunicated,whichwouldbeakeyissueofconductingcredible
monetarypolicy.Moretransparencymayresultmorecredibility,howeverwedonotdrawanydistinctionbetweentheexamineddiscretionaryregimesinthisregard.MAgYAr nEMZETI BAnk
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The presented model is a thinking frame and definitely not a full-scale model to be estimated. The most powerful attribute 
of its unfamiliar build is, however, it can serve analytical deductions in such cases where models with infinite periods would 
fail, while, in spite of its simplicity in methodology, it does serve consistent results with those prevalent models. we utilize 
this feature in the exploration of new results.
               Period (t)
Variable
0 1 2 3  4
pt 0 p1 p2 0 0
xt 0 0 x2 x3 0
pt 0 p1 p1+ p2 p1+ p2 p1+ p2
pt
*, xt
*, pt
* 0 0 0 0 0
et 0 e1 0 0 0
ut 0 e1 ρe1 ρ2e1 0
Table	1
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when judging various regimes, we let society decide, therefore, when the social loss function indicates a lower value, it is 
considered to be the better policy. For good perspicuity, solely in the domain of our framework, the best discretionary policy 
is denoted to be the optimal if it can replicate the commitment solution, and (sub)optimal if it can not. First, we examine 
results under specific conditions, and then step by step loosing constraints, eventually we obtain general results. keeping in 
mind that l and δ have inverse relationship to social loss, suppose for simplicity that a change in the output gap puts an equal 
impact on the inflation (δ=1). Thus, examination implicitly follows the implications of the altering ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve 
(see Appendix B).27
3.1		No	exogeNous	peRsIsTeNCe	(ρ=0)
3.1.1		only	inflation	matters	(l=0)
If society focuses solely on inflation variability, the dynamic response of inflation, output, price level, and the level of loss, 
when expectation structure is forward looking, is showed in Chart 1 (θ=0.5 is used in HT).28
If expectations are forward looking, ITC, the theoretical benchmark implements price stability. Along such expectations, PT 
provides the best performance out of discretionary solutions; it achieves a total expected loss equal to the benchmark, which is half 
the size than in the case of IT. Due to the forward looking expectations, price level target proved itself to be useful, and just like in 
the case of ITC, only the half of the shock appeared in the inflation of the first period (0.5e1). In the case of HT, the inflation of 
the first period was higher (0.667e1), the correction in the second period was the half of it (–0.334e1, since θ=0.5), and resulted in 
a moderate price level drift. Conspicuous, that the expected loss was largely diminished by the partial presence of price level target.
27 Itfollowsthatduringexaminationswewillrunthevalueofluptoempiricallyimplausibleranges.Sincetheestimatedvaluesofd areclosetozero(seeChapter5),
largevaluesoflhasitsrationale.
28Intheresponsediagrams,thescalesoftheordinatesarefixedinordertoeasecomparabilityofthedifferentcases.
3		Comparing	the	regimes
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If the expectation structure is purely backward looking, we have totally different result (Chart 2). The order turns around 
with PT performing at its low by creating an expected loss double as much as IT does. In this case, ITC means a price level 
drift equal to the size of the shock, which is the same as what happened in the IT regime. what is the root of this? The PT 
regime has to maintain the price level target. Due to the purely backward looking expectations, price level target plays no 
orienting role at all; therefore, the shock gets integrated in the inflation of the first period at maximum extent. In the second 
period, a price rise of the same magnitude would occur due to lagged pricing. The task of the monetary authority is eventually 
to neutralize this inflationary pressure and to undo the price rise of the previous period, which means higher inflation 
volatility compared to IT.29  
Inflation  expectations  perceivable  in  reality  are  not  characterized  by  these  extreme  structures.30  In  order  to  conduct 
comparative analysis, let us take a look at Chart 3, which shows the losses of regimes as a function of expectations, more 
precisely as the degree of forward lookingness; S
^(φ), S ˜(φ), S ˘(φ), and S(φ) denote social loss indicated under IT, PT, HT, and 
ITC, respectively.31
29Atthesametime,itmeanshigheroutputgapvolatility,too,butnowithasnorelevanceforsociety.
30Chapter5providesabroaderempiricaloutlook.
31 VariabilityofinflationandoutputgaparediscussedextensivelyinChapter4.Notethatperiodsociallossreflectsthelinearcombinationofthevarianceofinflation
andoutputgap.
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This chart shows that, depending on expectations, what discretionary policy is more adequate and where they are optimal. 
with the circumstances given, expected loss of IT is not influenced by the expectations, and in the case φ=0, its performance 
coincides with the one perceived by ITC. The more forward looking economy agents are, the better PT performs, and in the 
case of φ=1, it will be equivalent with the benchmark. The performance of HT depends on the value of θ: if θ→1, then S ˘(φ) 
embeds in the S ˜(φ) curve; if θ→0, then it embeds in the S
^(φ) curve.
Table 3 sums up the order of regimes under various expectations and policy mixes, i.e. when it is better to apply a certain 
policy, and gives the optimality criteria.
In the case of IT or PT with the circumstances given, the reproduction of the commitment solution will occur only at the two 
extreme expectation structures. In the case of hybrid expectation, HT stands for solution. with the proper balance between 
price level and inflation target, it is possible to create a result that is equivalent to ITC under every value of φ. with the current 
Chart	3
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criteria given, emphasis shall be taken on price level target exactly at the same extent as the degree of forward lookingness 
(e.g. see Chart 3). what stated above can be seen graphically in Chart 4.
The yellow curve shows what mix leads IT and HT to equivalent results. The blue curve means the same relation between PT 
and HT. The area above the yellow curve means the unambiguous dominance of IT. The area below the yellow curve and 
above the blue curve shows the superiority of hybrid policies over IT and PT regimes, while the area below the blue curve 
means the unambiguous superiority of PT. The relative effectiveness of PT and IT depends on expectations, with the previous 
one being a better option if the ratio of forward looking expectations is a bit over 40 per cent (  2 1 φ > − ). ITC can be 
achieved in any expectation structure, and optimal solutions fall on the diagonal.
one important question left to be cleared is the relation of HT policies under different expectation structures, which is shown 
in Chart 5.
In the forward looking case, adding some price level target to an IT loss function results in a notable decline in social loss. 
In the extremely backward looking case, incorporating some inflation target into a PT loss function decreases the loss as 
well; however, this latter decline is more significant, as we put more and more weight on the newly incorporated target. 
These relations are not linear, since the gains are decreasing. under hybrid expectations, this monotonicity disappears: to 
some extent, adding new targets reduces, but from a certain point, it increases social loss again. Moreover, concerning 
expectations, linearity does not stand either: if expectations of the economic agents shift from fully backward looking 
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behaviour, it ameliorate the performance of any HT more, than a same size shift would do it closer to the fully forward 
looking case.32
It is interesting to see the connections between our results and the ones founded on different basis. In the relations of inflation 
volatility under different hybrid regimes, similar result were reported by Dittmar et al. (1999) under new Classical Phillips 
Curve  with  high  output  gap  persistence.  running  simulations  with  four  different  values  of  hybrid  policy  weight,  they 
demonstrated that delegating even a low weighted price level target aside inflation target into the loss function of the central 
bank results in large drop in the uncertainty around future price path, which outcome, recall, is in line with the decreasing 
inflation variability in that kind of model.33 This result corresponds to ours in the cases of dominantly forward looking 
expectations. To reveal its background, one needs to look at how the output gap persistence affects different regimes. under 
new Classical Phillips curve, the empirical estimations of Cecchetti and kim (2005) demonstrated that with the rise of output 
gap persistence, the ab ovo small social welfare advantage of optimal hybrid policy, in contrast with price level targeting, is 
smoothly decreasing, while this advantage, in contrast with inflation targeting, is exponentially growing above a given degree 
of persistence. The more and more persistent the output gap is, i.e. the more and more the expectations implicitly forward 
looking are, then the benefits of regime switching to an optimal hybrid policy from price level targeting becomes less 
conspicuous  than  a  similar  regime  switch  from  inflation  targeting.  Thus,  it  explicitly  sheds  light  on  the  issue  that  the 
examination of the behaviour of HT (as well as of IT and PT) under new Classical Phillips curve with output gap persistence 
comes to similar results, as under a hybrid, at least moderately forward looking new keynesian environment.
3.1.2		multigoal	society	(l>0)
First, we are about to examine a society that considers the inflation and the output gap divergence from their preferred values 
equally harmful (l=1).
we knew right at the beginning that the dynamic response of the variables of the three discretionary regimes will not change 
compared to the preceding but their social loss levels. However, in the case of ITC the optimal values of variables and the 
loss are also affected, since it considers ‘real’ social preference.
32 Aspresentedpreviously,Chart5alsorevealsthatintheforwardlookingcaseitisPT,inthebackwardlookingcaseitisIT,andinthemeanitisHTwithequalweight
onpricelevelandinflationtarget,thatisthebestdiscretionarypolicy,andthatdifferentsetofexpectationsaffectperformanceofPTthemost,anddonotaffectIT
atall.
33 SimilarresultwerereportedbyBatiniandYates(2003)inmostcasesoftheiranalysis,namelythatthemostreductioninpricelevelvariabilitycanbeachievedby
movingslightlyawayfrompureinflationtargeting,butatthesametimeintheirmodel,itdidnotalwayscouplewithlowerinflationvariability.
Chart	5
social	loss	under	different	policy	mixes	(l=0,	ρ=0)
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In the case of purely forward looking expectations, inflation in the first period became higher than in the case of  l=0 
(0.667e1 instead of 0.5e1), and inflation shock was adjusted only partially (–0.334e1 instead of –0.5e1), since the opening of 
the output gap was dampened. The result is a price level drift that is less than the shock itself (0.334e1).
Chart	6
Dynamic	response	of	variables	and	social	loss	(φ=1,	l=1,	ρ=0)
Chart	7
Dynamic	response	of	variables	and	social	loss	(φ=0,	l=1,	ρ=0)
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In the case of fully backward pricing, the total shock builds into price level in the first period, and in the second period, ITC 
neutralized inflation persistence thereof only partially (–0.334e1), thus resulted in a further price level drift.
Chart 8 shows the social loss in the environment of the hybrid Phillips curve.
The order of strength among regimes has been reset. The disadvantages of the PT regime are plainer to see, especially when 
expectations are more and more backward looking. The reason behind is that the readjustment of the price level needed 
heavy intervention in the case of significant endogenous persistence: larger output gap had to be made, which is now 
penalized by the social loss function. Adding the importance of output gap volatility, IT has gained a relatively better 
position over PT. what even more important is that PT cannot replicate the commitment solution under any expectation 
structure.
However, the reproduction of the benchmark result by IT exists on a theoretical level. with any given l, there is only one 
expectation structure where IT can perform this, i.e. only by certain dot pairs (l′, φ′). The probability of the existence of a 
proper pair is zero, while there are very limited instruments of the economic policy to influence these variables.
HT could mean a solution to this dilemma. This regime has the advantage to unbind the constraints of the expectation 
structure by using weighted inflation and price level target mix, thus only the social preference weight remains the independent 
variable. under certain circumstances by picking the right θ, it enables to achieve the ITC solution at a positive social 
preference weight. The freedom of the hybrid policy is limited by the position of IT, which means that with a given l, it is 
capable to do so where
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) 1 S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ = < ≤ .  (8)
If the significance of the variance of the output gap becomes higher, the lower bound of inequality (8) will be satisfied by 
higher values of φ, which means that the latitude of HT keeps on diminishing,
  1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) 1 S S φ φ
− − ′ ′ = → , when l→∞,
and so it is necessary that θ→0. The rising of l enables HT to achieve the ITC solution on a shrinking (more and more 
forward looking) spectrum. To sum it up: in the range of values of φ where inequality (8) is not satisfied, IT is the (sub)optimal 
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policy, and in the range φ of satisfying the inequality, HT is the optimal policy. In the asymptotic case, S
^(1)=S(1), i.e. IT 
becomes the optimal policy in the fully forward looking case.34 Table 4 summarizes optimal policies.
Considering what has been said before, let us take a look again at Chart 8. It shows that in the case of purely forward looking 
expectations (φ=1) and that of inflation and output gap volatility having the same importance to society (l=1), the optimal 
combination to achieve the theoretical minimal loss is θ=0.5. generally, in the in the fully forward looking case, the optimal 
values of θ belonging to the various values of l are
  2
3 2
3 2
4 5 2
λ λ
θ
λ λ λ
+ +
=
+ + +
,  (9)
which is shown in Chart 9, adding optimal solutions under other expectation structures.35
This chart highlights that the rise of the preference weight, particularly by its lower values, (and/or the decline in the ‘slope’ 
of the Phillips curve) drastically worsen the usefulness of incorporating significant price level target aside inflation target into 
the loss function of the central bank, even in the forward looking case. The reason is that society does not like larger output 
gap variability needed for eliminating price level drift, and this is even more obvious with the increase of lagged pricing at 
the expense of forward looking behaviour, as the interventions required are even heavier. Two of the previous results can 
34Withelementarycalculus,S
^
(1)=S(1), ifλ→∞orλ=-2.
35 Althoughtheserelationscanbederivedanalyticallyatanygivenvaluesofφsatisfyinginequality(8),theyareabitlesstractableunderhybridexpectations.Thus,the
lattercasesweresolvednumerically.
Chart	9
optimal	policies	at	various	expectations	and	social	preference	weights	(ρ=0)
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Expectations Best policy Remarks
1 1 ˆ 0 ( ) ( ) S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ < < = IT, (sub)optimal ˆ(0) (0) S S ≠ , if l > 0
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ = = IT, optimal
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) 1 S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ = < ≤ HT, optimal
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) 1 S S φ φ
− − ′ ′ = = IT, optimal ˆ(1) (1) S S → , if l→∞
Table	4
optimal	policies	(l>0,	ρ=0)MAgYAr nEMZETI BAnk
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also be seen from a different perspective. In the fully forward looking case without exogenous persistence, PT can replicate 
ITC only if society does not concern the output gap variability, and under same expectations, IT can replicate the commitment 
solution only if preference weight tends to infinity (and/or the ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve tends to zero).
3.2		The	RoLe	of	The	exogeNous	peRsIsTeNCe	(ρ>0)
In the previous analysis, the exogenous persistence effect of the shock was not considered. There is the question whether its 
presence changes our previous results, and if it does, then what way. one should not forget that the already perceived lagged 
inflation is endogenously determined, while cost push shock persistence is exogenously given, since it is not affected by policy. 
Let us see what our model indicates with moderate persistence (ρ=0.5).
3.2.1		The	output	does	not	matter	(l=0)
First, the more simple case is considered when society cares about the inflation variability only.
Chart 10 shows the dynamic response of the output gap only, since there was no quality shift at all when compared to the 
case without persistence ceteris paribus. If we take a look again at the results of the model (Table 2), exogenous persistence 
effects can apparently be identified in every solution. The effect of the exogenous persistence increasing inflation would have 
been 0.5e1 in the second period, and 0.25e1 would have been in the third period. Every regime had to intervene at a higher 
scale when compared to the case without persistence: its absolute value is as much as higher the persistence would have 
contributed to the increase of inflation, thus the result is the shifting of the output gap into negative direction. since it does 
not affect losses, they are equivalent to the case without persistence.
3.2.2		The	output	gap	matters,	too	(l>0)
Again, suppose that the inflation and output gap variability have the same importance to society, l=1. It is clear that this 
change affects only the dynamics of the variables of ITC and, naturally, the loss of all regimes.
In the case of fully forward looking expectations, although inflation is set higher by ITC when compared to the case without 
persistence ceteris paribus, its increase is smaller than the pressure from persistence (the inflation in the first period is 0.8667e1 
instead of 0.667e1, and in the second it is –0.1667e1 instead of –0.334e1). The reason behind this is that commitment solution 
has countered the shock by widening the output gap (–0.667e1 instead of –0.334e1). Eventually, price level moved higher, 
although by the two third of the persistence effect of the first period only, when compared to the price level drift without 
persistence.
Chart	10
Dynamic	response	of	the	output	gap	(φ=1	and	φ=0,	l=0,	ρ=0.5)
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Chart	11
Dynamic	response	of	variables	and	social	loss		(φ=1,	l=1,	ρ=0.5)
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Chart	12
Dynamic	response	of	variables	and	social	loss	(φ=0,	l=1,	ρ=0.5)	
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In  the  case  of  purely  backward  looking  inflation  expectations,  the  shock  appears  in  the  price  level  of  the  first  period 
completely in the commitment solution. In the second period, ITC neutralizes around the three fourth of the inflation 
pressure originating from exogenous persistence and backward pricing (which is totally 1.5e1). This means that the drift in 
price level is larger by one sixth of the persistence effect when compared to the case without persistence.
In order to analyze the hybrid expectation structure, let us take a look at Chart 13.
Larger interventions due to the exogenous persistence have the similar observational loss effect as if the importance of the 
output gap variance (l) had increased (and/or the ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve had declined). Contrary to the case without 
persistence, ITC cannot be reproduced by a discretionary regime at all if the increase of l goes beyond a certain point, while 
this point appears during the persistence increase at a lower l, i.e. its higher value nullifies the latitude of monetary policy 
concerning hybrid strategies sooner. The opportunity for HT is limited by the position of the IT which is affected by the 
change in l and ρ at different scale. Theoretical optimum can be achieved by HT, where
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) 1 S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ = < ≤  (10)
can be satisfied. If l≤1, solutions always exist under any degree of persistence; however, if l>1, inequality (10) can not be 
satisfied  unconditionally.  This  criterion  implicitly  determines  a  proper  subset  W  of  the  vector  space 
 
0 { ( , , ): ,0 1, } V v λ ρ δ λ ρ δ
+ + = = ∈ ≤ < ∈ R R , where IT and HT have the capability to implement the commitment solution. 
Combinations generating the boundary of this subset in the critical interval of l>1 are satisfying equality (11),
2
2
( )
2
g
λ
ρ λ
λ λ
+
= =
+
.  (11)
In such situations when the economy is characterized by these combinations, only IT can reproduce the benchmark solution, 
namely in the fully forward looking case. Beyond this boundary, none of the discretionary regimes can achieve ITC, and in 
that case, it is IT that provides the best policy, even though (sub)optimal one only, in the whole range of expectations. Table 
5 summarizes optimal policy criteria, while Chart 14 shows the abovementioned subset.
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Chart 14 shows, if l≤1, then persistence per se is not a constrain at all for the existence of optimal hybrid policies.36 For 
instance, in the case of ρ=0.5, HT has a relevance, if l<2, which means that it is capable, through a narrowing expectation 
range with the increase of l at the same time, to achieve the theoretical optimum. If l=2, then S
^(1)=S(1), i.e. only IT can 
reproduce ITC, and only in the fully forward looking case; however, if l>2, then none of the discretionary regimes is capable 
of that. Hence, IT gives the solutions closest to ITC throughout the whole expectation spectrum.
Demonstrating the relationship between optimal policy mix and persistence under fully forward looking expectations, we 
analytically derive the borderline case (l=1), where HT is not constrained to be optimal by any value of ρ (and/or by any 
value of δ). optimal policy mixes are
 
( )
2
2
2
2
ρ ρ
θ
ρ
− −
=
+
,
which is shown in Chart 15 next to other numerically computed solutions.37
36Atl=1,S
^(1)=S(1)wouldrequireρ=1,whatcannotbe.
37Theycanbederivedanalytically;however,again,thosecasesareabitclumsier.
Expectations Best policy Criteria Remarks
1 1 ˆ 0 ( ) ( ) S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ ≤ < = IT, (sub)optimal
ρ ∀ , if l ≤ 1;
ρ < g(l), if l > 1
If  ( ) g ρ l =  and  1 φ = , 
IT is optimal ( ˆ(1) (1) S S = );
If g(l) < ρ, IT is (sub)optimal,  
0 1 φ ≤ ∀ ≤
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ = = IT, optimal
1 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) 1 S S φ φ φ
− − ′ ′ = < ≤ HT, optimal
Table	5
optimal	policies	(l>0,	ρ>0)
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Chart	15
optimal	policies	at	various	measures	of	cost	push	shock	persistence38
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Larger cost push shock persistence calls for larger emphasis on inflation rather than price level target. The result is not 
surprising: larger intervention requirements, thus larger output fluctuations cased by more persistent cost push shocks arise 
more strikingly under PT than under IT. Just as we have already discussed, inflation variability, thus the inflation stabilizing 
effect of (partial) price level target gradually loses its significance with the rise of l, and therefore, optimal policy response is 
to put less weight on the price level target as well. on the other hand, we can also see that these proportionalities are different 
if inflation is endogenously persistent, too, since it also affects social loss, thus optimal policy choices. In the next section, we 
take a closer look at the underlying forces driving the variability of inflation and output gap. The composite visualization of 
our previous discussion is shown in Chart 16.
38 Intheforwardlookingcase,optimalpolicyatzeroordinate(thatisIT)comprisescombinationsof(l,ρ)thatsatisfyequality(11)(thedefinedboundaryofsubsetW).
Whenl→∞,thenthesecurvescollapsetoapointintotheorigin.MnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 27
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Chart	16	
optimal	and	(sub)optimal	policies	(φ=1	and	0.7)39
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The presented model always indicates higher output gap variability in the case of PT related to IT, however, it shows lower 
inflation variability under certain circumstances.40 The reason is the implementation of the control lag. In the fully forward 
looking case, IT creates no output gap in the period following the cost push shock, as it has no reason, while PT must 
shepherd the price level back to its targeted value. It is more straightforward in those cases, where the expectations are more 
and more backward looking, since the expectation driving effect of using a price level target deteriorates more and more, 
hence the initial jump in inflation is higher.41
Chart	17
Inflation	and	output	gap	variability,	l=0,	ρ=0	and	l=1,	ρ=0.5	(d=1)
The output gap variability moves inversely to the ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve which has the same effect under IT and PT, and 
moves along with exogenous inflation persistence, but, on the contrary, this latter one does not have the same impact on IT 
and PT. According to PT, it causes additional intervention requirement in period 2, however, it helps to counter the backward 
pricing effect for one period after the deflationary phase. on the other hand, when expectations are rather forward looking, 
it may mean burden in every period. The situation in the case of IT is simpler, since exogenous inflation persistence always 
means  additional  intervention  requirement  on  the  whole  range  of  expectations.  Thus,  with  the  rise  of  the  exogenous 
persistence, the difference between output gap variances is the dependent of these interdependence impacts (see Chart 18).
40 ThesimulationofFillionandTetlow(1994)alsoreportedthatPTcreateslowerinflationvariabilitybuthigheroutputgapvariabilitythanIT,butasSvensson(1999)
alreadynoted,theydidnotgiveexplanationbeyondthattheseresultsindicatestrongserialcorrelationofthepricelevel.Inmostsetups,BatiniandYates(2003)also
foundlargeroutputgapvariabilityunderpricelevelstabilization.
41 Allelsebeingequal,iftherewasnocontrollag,theoutputgapvariabilitywouldbelowerinPTcomparedtoITinthefullyforwardlookingcase,andwouldbethe
sameinthefullybackwardlookingcase.
4		Inflation	and	output	gap	variablity
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Chart	18
Differences	in	output	gap	variability	of	pT	and	IT,	(d=1)
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The estimation of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) using a sticky price model showed near equivalent forward and backward looking 
behaviour, while galí and gertler (1999) demonstrated that the forward looking behaviour is more dominant.42 Also, galí 
and gertler (1999) emphasized the sluggish behaviour of real marginal cost, which might be a good explanation of the slow 
inflation response to output gap, hence, the high and costly output gap needed for making inflation move. This flattening 
tendency of the Phillips curve is also demonstrated by sbordone (2007). she found that global competition affecting us 
economy decreases the sensitivity of inflation to marginal cost. Continuous cost push shocks due to oil and food prices seem 
to be inevitable, too. Backward pricing, declining ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve, and persistent cost push shocks are not too 
favourable background for targeting a constant price level, though could be for hybrid policy according to the presented 
model.43
However, these conditions are not petrified. Even so, from a rather practical point of view, “conventional wisdom” always 
builds  its  arguments  not  to  target  constant  price  level  upon  perceived  conditions  that  are  considered  as  if  they  were 
exogenously given. At an early stage, the reason mentioned was transmission uncertainty44, but later the upward measurement 
bias in Consumer Price Index (CPI), downward nominal rigidities, the zero bound problem on nominal interest rates, and the 
threat of deflationary spiral became the main obstacles emphasized.45 They happened to be the main arguments in favour of 
defining “price stability” as an inflation rate of consumer prices around 2 per cent. upward bias in CPI is an exact category46 
and can be a reasonable counterargument of targeting its constant level, however, large magnitude of downward nominal 
rigidity cannot be proved with no doubt even in current monetary systems.47 Though employees typically resist nominal wage 
reductions, in the case of prices, Amirault et al. (2004) found that firms in Canada actually modify prices more flexible 
downward than upward. They also pointed that the absolute flexibility of prices grew over time due to stronger competition 
and larger recline upon information technology. They draw the conclusion that flexible prices may mean larger inflation 
response  to  interest  rate  movements,  thus  targets  may  be  achieved  with  shorter  lags  and  smaller  real  side  effects.  The 
remainder arguments are also disputable in the sense of Lucas critique, since these phenomena may reflect the policy-affected 
economy of its era.48 The swedish episode of the 1930s showed that maintaining a constant price level target is feasible 
without falling into the pit of the zero bound problem. As Berg and Jonung (1999) emphasized the lessons learned, price level 
targeting  helped  to  raise  inflation  expectations  despite  the  persistent  worldwide  deflationary  pressure.49  This  historical 
evidence seems to be a fine support of Lucas critique as the change in the policy modified the expectations of the economic 
agents, thus it was revealed that some of the ‘axiomatic causalities’ were only the manifest of a reigning paradigm. Fujiwara 
42 GalíandGertler(1999)arguedthatthereforetheNewKeynesianPhillipscurvegivesagoodfirstapproximationoftheinflationdynamics.RuddandWhelan(2005)
andLindè(2005)claimedthatitisaresultofspecificationbias,whileKurmann(2005)pointedouttheuncertaintyaroundtheestimationprocedure.Inarecentpaper,
Galíetal.(2005)standoutfortheirresults.Dufouretal.(2006)foundthathybridNewKeynesianPhillipscurveisnotsupportedunconditionally,andemphasized
theimportanceofusingidentification-robustinferencemethods.
43 Thelatitudeandapplicabilityofhybridpolicyisalsorestrictedbyallofthesetendencies,andatthesametime,aswehavealreadynotedreferringtoCecchettiand
Kim(2005),thisregimehasthedisadvantagethatahybridtargetisveryhardtobecommunicated,whichwouldbeakeyissueofconductingcrediblemonetary
policy.Moreover,wemayadd,thatthataninflationtargetoraconstantpriceleveltargetiseasiertobecommunicatedthanapositive-slopepriceleveltargetor
evenmorethananaverageinflationtargetorahybridtarget.
44 Inthe1960s-70s,uncertaintyaroundmonetarytransmissionwashigh,sincethelagwaslongandvariable.ThatwasthereasonwhyFriedman(1968)emphasized
theimpossibilityofpricestabilization,butaddedthatitcouldbeotherwise,ifthe“understandingofmonetaryphenomenaadvances”.Aucontraire,itwasnotthe
caseatthebeginningofthe20thcentury.AccordingtotheobservationofFisher(1920)ontheUSeconomy,themonetarytransmissionreliablyexerteditsfulleffect
onpricesinonetothreemonths,againcontrarytotheexperienced1.5-2yearsofourtime.
45 SeeFischer(1994)andMishkin(2001).Mishkin(2006)reconsideredhisearlierscepticalviewcontemplatingthecaseofJapan,andconcludedthatPTcanbe
favourableinaneconomyexperiencingdeflationarypressure.
46 SeeestimationsonthebiasofUSCPIbyBoskinetal.(1996),LebowandRudd(2003),andGordon(2006),andofHCIPbyWynne(2005).
47 Wecanalsofindhistoricalexampleslookingatthe3percentfallofconsumerpricesinJapanbetween1998-2002,oranapproximate20percentfallofconsumer
pricesinGreatPowersandotherdevelopedcountriesbetween1890-1896.Tworatherdifferentmonetaryregimesstandbehindthetwodatacited:thefirstonefrom
fiatandcreditmoneysystem,andthesecondoneisfromthegoldstandard,respectively.Thecausesofpricedeclinediffercompletely.InthecaseofJapan,itreflects
inadequatedemandoriginatinginpolicydifficultiesthatwillbediscussedlater,whilethelattertimeseriesreflectstheeffectofgoldscarcityundergoldstandard;
sincethepriceofacertainamountofgoldwasfixed,otherprices,i.e.pricelevelhadtomovedown,restoringtheappropriateparitybetweengoldandother
commodities.
48Inthepriceleveltargetingliterature,thenecessityofthiskindofapproachwasemphasizedfirstbyBlackandGavin(1990).
49 StraumannandWoitek(2009)arguedthatasamatteroffact,Riksbankpursuedexchangeratetargetingpolicyandthatachievingpricelevelstabilitywasdueto
coincidenceofmultipleeconomicfactors.BergandJonung(1999)claimedthatalthoughthepolicywasnever‘pure’priceleveltargeting,exchangeratestabilization
wasonlyasecondaryobjective.
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noTEs on EMPIrICAL IssuEs
et al. (2005) summarized recent knowledge about escaping possibilities from the liquidity trap, referring to the models of 
Eggertsson and woodford (2003), wolman (2005), and others, and concluded the same, namely, that some form of price 
level targeting needed that can flatten yield curve, helping to evade hitting the zero bound.
on small open economy aspects, there are also appealing prospects in favour of price level targeting. utilizing a comprehensive 
(two-country) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, Coletti et al. (2008) argued that a small, open economy like 
Canada could benefit from the implementation of price level targeting, since it would provide larger inflation stability at the 
cost of only slightly higher output gap variability. The results of their model demonstrated that if the proportion of rule-of-
thumb price and wage setting behaviour is less than 40 per cent (which is highly realistic), then price level targeting always 
dominates inflation targeting, otherwise this relation is hanging on the source of the shocks. only shocks that cause inverse 
movements in the output gap and inflation can make inflation targeting more favourable, but only if backward price setting 
is prevalent. If the resultant of different kind of shocks affecting terms of trade generates positive covariance between inflation 
and the output gap, like in Canada, then it makes price level targeting appealing for a highly open economy. Coletti et al. 
(2008) also demonstrated that a switch in the monetary policy framework of a large partner country (which is the united 
states  in  their  model)  does  affect  neither  the  relative  merits  of  inflation  targeting  and  price  level  targeting,  nor  the 
parameterisation of the Canadian monetary policy rule.50
50 SinceonlyBankofCanadadealswiththepossibilityoftheimplementationofpriceleveltargetinginveryseriousmanner,werelyupontheirresultswithmore
emphasis.MnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 32
In the presented three-period steady state to steady state framework, it is showed that inflation, price level and hybrid 
targeting can all become the best solution under certain circumstances. Considering control lag, the model indicated that price 
level targeting always creates higher output gap variability than inflation targeting, whereas the relation in inflation variability, 
and so the social loss implication, is an open issue, sensitively depending on the examined conditions.
Inflation targeting proved far more robust than price level targeting, while hybrid targeting had the best adaptability. It is 
showed  that,  without  exogenous  inflation  persistence,  inflation  targeting  and  hybrid  targeting  can  always  reproduce 
commitment solution on a descending, more and more forward looking range of expectations with the rise of the social 
preference weight on the output gap (and/or with the decline of the ‘slope’ of the Phillips Curve), while in the most general 
and realistic case, the existence of exogenous persistence makes the possibility of reproduction to the function of the social 
preference weight (and/or the ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve).
The examination demonstrated the non-linear interrelations of economic and policy parameters. The impacts of changing 
parameter  values  on  inflation  variability,  output  gap  variability  and  social  loss  manifest  in  different  proportionalities, 
moreover, not always in monotonic fashion.
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A		moDeL	soLuTIoNs
A.1		Inflation	targeting	with	commitment
The expected loss to be minimized subject to the constraints given by Phillips curve is
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simple rearrangements and substitutions lead to the optimal solutions.
A.2		Inflation	targeting
The expected loss to be minimized is
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p2=0 and p3=0.
According to equations (6) and (7),  1| 0 t t π + = . with simple substitutions into the conditions given by the Phillips curve, 
solutions are obtained.
A.3		price	level	targeting
The expected loss to be minimized is
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According to equations (6) and (7),   *
1| t t t t p p p π + = − = − . with simple substitutions into the conditions given by the Phillips 
curve, solutions are obtained.
A.4		hybrid	targeting
using the transformation of
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the loss function to be minimized is
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According to equations (6) and (7),  
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t
t t t p π θ π + = − − . with simple substitutions into the conditions given by the Phillips 
curve, solutions are obtained.
on an infinite horizon, price level under HT converges to the same optimal path as under PT, since this path is solely defined 
by the price level target component. However, the adjustment of price level is more moderate under HT than under PT, since 
its deviation from that path is less penalized (hence, the larger the emphasis on price level target, the closer the adjustment 
speed is). since our model captures the ‘reasonable’ time horizon where the initial drift of price level under PT is completely 
eliminated and then closed by construction, price level adjustment can happen only partially under HT. still, high credibility 
assumption holds, since HT performs the expected time-proportional correction of the initial drift.
B		soCIAL	pRefeReNCe	weIghT	AND	The	‘sLope’	of	The	phILLIps	CuRve
Considering the commitment solution, one can recognize the relation scheme51
  1
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λ δ
δ
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51 Forperspicuity,theschemeofthefullyforwardlookingcaseisdemonstrated.Similarwouldbethecaseofthediscretionaryregimesinahigherresolution(e.g.
infinite-period)model,whereweightsonoutputgaparenotsettozero.MnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 35
APPEnDIx
in the case of the output gap, and
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in the case of inflation.
what does that mean? If the output gap does not matter at all (l=0), and the central bank should focus on the inflation target 
alone, then only the ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve determines the size of the output gap necessary to achieve the goals. If it is 
not just the inflation, but the output gap matters (l>0), then it can be seen that the rules reduce the output level divergence 
from the potential one.
Considering the inflation rule, there are equivalent outcomes in any cases where 
 
0
λ
δ
= , since δk=1 at the same time. If δ=∞, 
then the central bank can make, with minimal intervention, the inflation move infinitely, and therefore, the preference weight 
on the output gap is not relevant. If l=0, the inflation rule is independent from the ‘slope’ of the Phillips curve, as the scale 
of the intervention does not matter. These situations result in the same social loss; the only difference between the two cases 
can be captured in the size (and the variability) of the output gap. In discretionary regimes, because of the model structure, 
the social loss implications of these relations are more straightforward.MnB workIng PAPErs • 2010/8 36
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